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Abstract 
 
Publicity surrounding the threat of cyber-attacks continues to grow, yet immature classification 
methods for these events prevent technical staff, organizational leaders, and policy makers from 
engaging in meaningful and nuanced conversations about the risk to their organizations or 
critical infrastructure. This paper provides a taxonomy of cyber events that is used to analyze 
over 2,431 publicized cyber events from 2014-2016 by industrial sector. Industrial sectors vary 
in the scale of events they are subjected to, the distribution between exploitive and disruptive 
event types, and the method by which data is stolen or organizational operations are disrupted. 
The number, distribution, and mix of cyber event types highlight significant differences by 
sector, demonstrating that strategies may vary based on deeper understandings of the threat 
environment faced across industries.  
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Introduction 
 
Network security is increasingly recognized as a strategic vulnerability as a growing number of 
corporate intrusions are reported. These breaches can affect customer privacy, confidence in a 
company’s ability to protect core intellectual property, and essential operations. Large numbers 
of intrusions have also occurred into government networks, with recent high-profile breaches 
including a significant compromise at the Office of Personal Management (OPM) and at the 
credit monitoring service Equifax.  
 
As the private and public sectors grapple with the problem of cyber events, disagreement 
remains regarding what can and should be done. Technical solutions, organizational resiliency, 
employee education, and improvements in system controls are among many options to reduce 
risk. Yet, they are rarely evaluated as part of a strategic approach for addressing diverse threats, 
which vary by industry.  
 
Confusion about threats and response options originates in part from imprecision in how we 
categorize and measure the range of disruptive cyber events. By failing to recognize the 
distinctions between specific forms of attack, the effects they produce on the targeted networks, 
the financial strain they place on the targeted organizations, or their broader effects on society, 
this confusion leads to the misallocation of resources.  
 
This paper provides a new taxonomy that expands on earlier work by the author and colleagues 
to classify cyber incidents by the range of disruptive and exploitative effects produced. It applies 
the taxonomy in a sector-based analysis of 2,431 publicized cyber events from 2014-2016. It 
finds some striking differences across industries in the scale, method of attack, and distribution 
of effect. Government and Professional Services face the largest number of attacks. Governments 
experience a mix of disruptive and exploitive events, whereas retail and hotel operators primarily 
face exploitive attacks. These findings highlight the need for deeper analysis by sector to assess 
the risk for specific organizations and critical infrastructure. They also suggest the importance of 





A confusing array of cyber threat classification systems have been proposed over the past two 
decades. Some are based on different phases of the hacking process, while others focus on 
specific targets. For example, de Bruijne et al (2017) has created a classification of actors and 
methods, whereas Gruschka (2010) develops a taxonomy of attacks against cloud systems. Other 
classification approaches focus on specific techniques, such as Distributed Denial of Service or 
DDoS attacks (Mirkovic 2004); specific targets, such as browsers (Gaur 2015); or particular IT 
capabilities, such as industrial control systems (Zhu 2017) and smart grids (Hu 2014).  
 
Few taxonomies in the information security literature seek to classify events by impact on the 
target, the key question for risk assessment. Only two (Howard 1998) and (Kjaerland 2005) 
directly propose categories of the effect to the victim. Others including Hansman (2005) focus on 
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the attack vector, vulnerabilities, and exploits, while incorporating Howard’s work on effect 
categories as part of their broader classification system.   
 
Howard’s widely cited taxonomy includes classification methods for attackers, objectives, tools, 
access, and impact. He divides the impact of cyber activity, described as the “unauthorized 
results,” into five categories: Corruption of Data, Disclosure of Information, Denial of Service, 
Increased Access, and Theft of Service. 
 
Kjaerland (2005) classifies cyber effects differently and as belonging to one of four categories: 
Disrupt, Distort, Destruct, and Disclosure.  He develops these categories in concert with other 
dimensions of analysis to evaluate the linkage between sector, actor, method, and target.  
 
Both of these effect-based taxonomies fail to meet basic standards of a well-defined taxonomy 
(Ranganathan 1957), including:  
 
Exclusiveness - No two categories should overlap or should have the same scope and boundaries. 
 
Ascertainability - Each category should be definitively and immediately understandable from its 
name. 
 
Consistency - The rules for making the selection should be consistently adhered to.  
 
Affinity and Context - As you move from the top of the hierarchical classification to the bottom, 
the specification of the classification should increase.  
 
Currency - Names of the categories in the classification should reflect the language in the 
domain for which it is created. 
 
Differentiation -When differentiating a category, it should give rise to at least two subcategories 
 
Exhaustiveness - The classification should provide comprehensive coverage to the domain of 
interest.  
 
Howard’s taxomony fails the exhaustiveness requirement because some important and 
increasingly common types of cyber events do not fit any of its categories. Examples of these 
omissions include attacks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, data 
deletion resulting from the use of wiper viruses, or social media account hijacking and website 
defacement.  
 
The Howard taxonomy also fails the test of exclusivity by including two overlapping effects 
categories: Increased Access and Theft of Resources. Most hackers seek greater access and 
misuse system resources as a means to an end, not as the final result. Their ultimate goal is not 
just access, but the illicit acquisition of information or the disruption of organizational services. 
For example, if a hacker wanted to illicitly gain and disseminate information about a company, 
they would first obtain unauthorized use of a specific computer or network. Using Howard’s 
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categorization of that activity we would have to define a hack of a company database as both a 
Theft of Resources as well as a Disclosure of Information event type.       
 
Kjaerland’s classification system also fails important tests for a well-designed taxonomy. By 
allowing the same event to be assigned to multiple categories, it violates the criteria of 
exclusivity and consistency. For example, Kjaerland’s definition of Destruct notes that “Destruct 
is seen as the most invasive and malicious and may include Distort or Disrupt.”  
 
Kjaerland also fails the test of context by mixing impact classification (e.g. destruction of 
information) with specific tactics or tools. For example, in his definition of Disrupt he classifies 
use of a Trojan as a Disrupt event. However, a Trojan is a technique of hiding a malicious 
program in another. That technique can cause many different types of effects depending on 
whether it is used to steal or destroy information.   
 
 
A New Taxonomy  
 
This paper extends previous work (Harry 2015) (Harry & Gallagher 2017) to offer a new 
taxonomy for classifying the primary effects on a target of any given cyber event.  
 
I define a cyber event as the result of any single unauthorized effort, or the culmination of many 
such technical actions, that engineers, through use of computer technology and networks, a 
desired primary effect on a target. For example, if a hacker used a spearphish email to gain 
access and then laterally moved through the network to delete data on five machines, that would 
count as a single event type whose primary effect resulted in the destruction of data. This 
encapsulation of hacker tactics and tradecraft into specification of the primary effect of those 
actions is what I define as a cyber event.  
 
In the risk assessment framework developed at the Center for International and Security Studies 
at Maryland (CISSM), primary effects are the direct impacts to the target organization’s data or 
IT-enabled operations. Cyber events can also cause secondary effects to the organization, such as 
the financial costs of replacing equipment damaged in an attack, a drop in the organization’s 
stock price, due to bad publicity from the attack, or a loss of confidence in the organization’s 
ability to safeguard confidential data. And, they can cause second order effects on individuals or 
organizations who rely on the targeted organization for some type of goods or services. These 
could include effects on the physical environment, the supply chain, or even distortions an attack 
might have on an individual’s attitudes, preferences, or opinion deriving from the release of 
salacious information. While these are important areas to consider, they are outside of the scope 
of this paper.  
 
Any given cyber event can have one of two types of primary objectives: the disruption to the 
functions of the target organization, or the illicit acquisition of information. An attacker might 
disrupt an organization’s ability to make products, deliver services, carry out internal functions, 
or communicate with the outside world in a number of ways. Alternatively, hackers may seek to 
steal credit card user accounts, intellectual property, or sensitive internal communications to get 
financial or other benefits without disrupting the organization’s operations. 




A malicious actor may utilize multiple tactics that have wildly different disruptive effects 
depending on how an organization uses information technology to carry out its core functions. 
For example, an actor could delete data from one or more corporate networks, deploy 
ransomware, destroy physical equipment used to produce goods by manipulating Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, prevent customers from reaching an 
organization’s website, or deny access to a social media account. 
 
Disruptive effects can be classified into five sub-categories depending on the part of an 
organization’s IT infrastructure that is most seriously impacted, regardless of what tactic or 
techniques were used to accomplish that result. They are: Message Manipulation, External 
Denial of Service, Internal Denial of Service, Data Attack, and Physical Attack.  
 
Message Manipulation. Any cyber event that interferes with a victim’s ability to accurately 
present or communicate its “message” to its user or customer base is a Message Manipulation 
attack. These include the hijacking of social media accounts, such as Facebook or Twitter, or 
defacing a company website by replacing the legitimate site with pages supporting a political 
cause. For example, in 2015, ISIS affiliated hackers gained access to the YouTube and Twitter 
accounts for US CENTCOM. The hackers changed the password, posted threatening messages to 
U.S. Service members, and replaced graphics with ISIS imagery (Lamothe 2015). Similarly, in 
2016, the website for the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) was defaced after a 
controversial decision to disqualify an Iranian competitor (Cimpanu 2016). Both events used 
different tactics, but the primary effect on the targeted organization’s ability to interact with its 
audience was the same.   
 
Figure	1:	Cyber	Event	Taxonomy	
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External Denial of Service. If an attacker executes a cyber-attack from devices outside the target 
organization’s network that degrades or denies the victim’s ability to communicate with other 
systems, it is classified as an External Denial of Service event. For example, the 2016 Mirai 
botnet attack leveraged a compromised set of devices worldwide to overwhelm the DYN 
corporation with domain name look-up requests, causing a number of major internet platforms 
and services that rely on DYN’s services to stop functioning for many hours (Woolf 2016). 
While there are many types of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (ICMP flood, SYN 
flood, ping of death, etc.), any of those techniques would produce outcomes that fit the External 
Denial of Service cyber event category. 
 
Internal Denial of Service. When a cyber event executed from inside a victim’s network 
degrades or denies access to other internal systems, it is an Internal Denial of Service attack. For 
instance, an attacker who had gained remote access to a router inside an organization’s network 
could reset a core router to factory settings so that devices inside the network could no longer 
communicate with one another. The anti DDOS vendor Staminus apparently experienced such an 
internal denial of service attack in 2016. It issued a public statement that “a rare event cascaded 
across multiple routers in a system-wide event, making our backbone unavailable.” (Reza 2016). 
An attacker using malware installed on a file server to disrupt data sent and received between 
itself and a user workstation would achieve a similar effect.  
 
Data Attack. Any cyber event that manipulates, destroys, or encrypts data in a victim’s network 
is categorized as a Data Attack. Common techniques include the use of wiper viruses and 
ransomware. Using stolen administrative credentials to manipulate data and violate its integrity, 
such as changing grades in a university registrar’s database would also fit this category. For 
example, in 2017 the mass deployment of the NotPeyta ransomware resulted in thousands of data 
attack cyber events against individuals as well as to small, medium, and large businesses, with 
one case costing the shipping firm Maersk over $200 million (Matthews 2017).   
 
Physical Attack. A cyber event that manipulates, degrades, or destroys physical systems is 
classified as a Physical Attack. Current techniques used to achieve this type of effect include the 
manipulation of Programable Logic Controllers (PLC) to open or close electrical breakers or 
utilize user passwords to access and change settings in a human machine interface to overheat a 
blast furnace, causing damage to physical equipment. For example, in the December 2015 cyber-
attack on a Ukrainian utility, a malicious actor accessed and manipulated the control interface to 
trip several breakers in power substations. This deenergized a portion of the electrical grid and 





Some cyber events are designed to steal information rather than to disrupt operations. Hackers 
may be seeking customer data, intellectual property, classified national security information, or 
sensitive details about the organization itself. While the tactics or techniques used by malicious 
actors may change regularly, the location from which they get that information does not. I define 
five categories of an exploitive event below: Exploitation of Sensors, Exploitation of End Hosts, 
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Exploitation of Infrastructure, Exploitation of Application Servers, and Exploitation of Data in 
Transit. 
 
Exploitation of Sensors. A cyber event that results in the loss of data from a peripheral device 
like a credit card reader, automobile, smart lightbulb, or a network-connected thermostat is 
categorized as an Exploitation of Sensor event. The attack on Eddie Bauer stores where hackers 
gained access to hundreds of Point of Sale machines and systematically stole credit card numbers 
from thousands of customers fits this category (Krebs 2016). Other examples include illicit 
acquisition of technical, customer, personal, or organizational data from CCTV cameras, smart 
TVs, or baby monitors.    
 
Exploitation of End Hosts. Hackers often are interested in the data stored on user’s desktop 
computers, laptops, or mobile devices. When data is stolen through illicit access to devices used 
directly by employees of an organization or by private individuals it is categorized as an 
Exploitation of End Host cyber event. Tactics used in this type of attack include sending a 
malicious link for a user to click or leveraging compromised user credentials to log in to an 
account.    
 
Exploitation of Network Infrastructure. When data is compromised through direct access to 
networking equipment such as routers, switches, and modems, the attack is classified as an 
Exploitation of Network Infrastructure event. These types of events involve a hacker who, 
through use of an exploit or credential compromise, gains direct access to the underlying 
infrastructure. For example, a malicious actor who used a vulnerability in the CISCO IOS 
operating system to steal configuration information from an organization’s core routing 
infrastructure would engineer an Exploitation Network Infrastructure cyber event.    
 
Exploitation of Application Server. Malicious actors who, through misconfiguration or 
vulnerability, gain access to data contained in a server-side application (e.g. database) or on the 
server itself would generate an Exploitation of Application Server event. A hacker using a SQL 
injection to access millions of customer records or the direct access of an e-mail server with all 
organizational correspondence would fit into this category. For instance, the compromise of data 
in the Office of Personnel Management was the result of access by a malicious actor to a 
database hosted on a server (Koerner 2016). Stealing the data required several steps and months 
of work, but the event is classified by its ultimate outcome—loss of sensitive information from 
central servers hosting large database applications.     
 
Exploitation of Data in Transit. Hackers who acquire data as it is being transmitted between 
devices cause Exploitation of Data in Transit events. Examples of this type of event include the 
acquisition of unencrypted data as it is sent from a PoS device to a database or moved from an 
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Testing the Taxomony on Cyber Events 2014-2016 
 
The best way to assess how well this classification system meets the criteria for a well-defined 
taxonomy is to see whether it can be easily and unambiguously used to categorize all the events 
in an extensive data set. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no public datasets of cyber attacks that include a variety of cyber events 
with a range of both exploitive and disruptive effects. Most public data repositories focus on 
some types of events to the exclusion of others. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, for example, 
has a dataset focused on domestic exploitive attacks, while the blog H-zone.org has a dataset 
focused on website defacement attacks (a subset of Message Manipulation). Other datasets are 
on privately maintained blogs and webpages.  Some do not use a repeatable process to classify or 
categorize by sector thereby limiting the range of analysis that can be applied. Others are 
compiled from proprietary data or are only available for a steep fee.  
 
To create a dataset that had the information needed to test the CISSM taxonomy, the author used 
systematic web searches to identify cyber events that could be characterized by their effects. 
Initial searches for generalized references to cyber attacks yielded 3,355 possible events that 
were referenced by blogs, security vendor portals, or other English-language news sources from 
January 2014 through December 2016.  
 
Of the initial 3,355 candidate cyber events initially discovered, 2,431 were included in the 
dataset (72%). Media reports about 909 of the candidate events were broad discussions of 
malware campaigns or generalized discussions about threat actor plans and tactics. These were 
excluded because they did not provide information on the primary effect to a specific victim. 
Media reports about an additional 15 events specifically spoke to the tactics used by the threat 
actor independent of the effect to the primary victim, so they were also discarded. For example, 
one source discussed the use of compromised Amazon Web services credentials to access a 
system but did not talk about what types of actions took place once in the target network.   
 
In complex cases where the victim suffered multiple effects (e.g. website defacement and 
DDoS), the dataset counts each effect as a separate, but overlapping, event registered to the 
victim. Cyber events were coded to include date, event type, organization type (using the North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS), a description of the event, and a link to the 
source.   
 
This dataset is not an exhaustive accounting of all cyber events during this period. It only 
includes events for which there was a direct news source that was verifiable and that provided 
some insight into the methods of the attack. The true population of malign cyber activity is 
unknown because some significant events are kept secret and many other cyber incidents are too 
trivial to warrant media attention. Nevertheless, this dataset includes a large enough number of 
events for it to be useful for testing the taxonomy and making rough generalizations about 
relative frequencies of different types of events in different sectors. 
 
As discussed earlier, a well-designed taxonomy should, among other things, account for all the 
items to be classified, clearly differentiate among categories, ensure that each item has a unique 
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classification, and have clear rules that can be consistently applied. The CISSM cyber event 
taxomony easily passed each test. 
 
Each of the 2,431 events in the dataset could be coded as either Exploitive or Disruptive and 
assigned to one of ten effect-based sub-categories in the CISSM taxonomy. This fulfills the 
exhaustiveness requirement. Treating complex attacks in which multiple effects were achieved 
by the hacker as a set of separate but overlapping events made it possible to apply the taxonomy 
in a consistent manner, to differentiate between categories of effect, and to maintain clear 
differentiation between the categorized effects. This analysis did not assess the taxonomy’s 
currency, ascertainability, or affinity, because these standards should be judged by individual 
users rather than the creator of the taxonomy. 
 
Many cyber classification systems run into the same three major problems: Their inability to 
distinguish between tactics and effects; their difficulty remaining relevant as threat actors change 
and hacking techniques evolve; and their applicability to some types of IT systems, but not 
others. The CISSM taxonomy disentangles stable categories of effects from the rapidly 
advancing tactics employed by an ever-changing set of state and non-state hackers in a way that 
can be applied to all IT systems in use today or envisioned for the future. 
 
 
Using the Taxonomy to Analyze Cyber Events  
 
Categorizing cyber events according to their effects rather than treating them as an 
indistinguishable, but ever increasing, mass of “cyberattacks” yields a number of useful insights. 
Of the 2,431 cyber events during the three-year period reviewed, over 70 percent (1,700) were 
exploitive, whereas 30 percent (725) were disruptive. This ratio appears to relatively stable when 
examining events on a yearly basis, too. Of the 633 events recorded in 2014, 67 percent (423) 
were exploitive, and 33 percent (210) were disruptive. Of the 843 cyber events in 2015, 67 
percent (563) were exploitive and 33 percent (280) were disruptive. And of the 955 events 
recorded in 2016, 75 percent (714) were exploitive events, compared with 25 percent  (241) that 
were disruptive.  
 
Of the 1,700 exploitative events, the two most common sub-categories are Exploitation of 
Application Server events and Exploitation of End Host events. Ninety percent of all exploitive 
events in the dataset fall into one of these two categories. This reflects the current popularity of 
SQL injection attacks against web applications, and the heavy use of spearphising campaigns 
against end users.  
 
A much smaller percentage of exploitative attacks fall into the other three categories, most likely 
because these types of events often require internal access, are inherently more difficult to pull 
off, are not as well monitored, or are not as well publicized. Exploitation of Sensor events 
represent only 5 percent of the exploitive events sample, probably because the value of data from 
many of the devices in this category, like smart thermostats and baby monitors, might not be as 
large as records from other sources. Whereas a ready market exists on the Dark Web for 
customer data stolen from POS devices, most types of sensor data will not be of broad interest. 
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The remaining 5 percent (90) of cyber events were divided between Exploitation of Network 
Infrastructure (70 events) and Exploitation of Data in Transit (20 events). These events often 
reflected the efforts of more skilled hackers who can leverage toeholds in networks to expand 
internal access and acquire information either from network infrastructure such as file shares or 
from unencrypted data passed internally through the network. 
 
The 725 disruptive cyber events in the dataset follow a similar pattern with most activity falling 
into categories that are generally less problematic. Ninety-six percent of all disruptive events are 
either Message Manipulation (60 percent, 433) or External Denial of Service (36 percent, 263) 
events. This events reflect efforts by malign actors using less sophisticated techniques to deface 
websites that are vulnerable to external access and manipulation, weak passwords surrounding 
social media accounts, or high levels of DDoS activity applied by actors against identified 
targets.  
 
The remaining 5 percent (29 events), are split between Internal Denial of Service (2 percent, 11 
events), Data Attack (2 percent, 14 events), or Physical Attack (1 percent, 4 events). These types 
of events involved internal networks, so they required more sophisticated access techniques or 
malware leveraged to engineer the intended disruptive effects.     
 
 
Sector Analysis for Cyber Events  
 
While looking at a general breakdown of cyber 
event type is useful, further analysis by sector 
reveals interesting variation of effect between 
industries. To conduct this analysis, the author 
coded the 2,431 cyber events collected using the 
North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS), a hierarchical classification system 
commonly used by the U.S. government and 
industry to collect, analyze, and publish 
information on the U.S. economy. The data set 
likely reflects over or under sampling in some 
industries and event types with specific state and 
federal laws requiring the publication of cyber-
attacks with others not requiring the same 
notification. For example, the State of 
Maryland’s Personal Information Protection Act 
imposes a 45-day notification requirement for 
businesses to notify residents when their personal 
data has been compromised, yet there is no such 
requirement when a business’ website has been 
defaced.    
 
An analysis of cyber event activity by sector 
reveals three interesting themes. First, while 
Figure	2:	Share	of	all	Cyber	Events	by	Sector	
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most industry sectors are represented in the data, some appear to be targeted by malicious actors 
more frequently. Second, the distribution between exploitive and disruptive event types varies by 
sector, with some sector’s distribution diverging significantly from the overall average. Finally, 
industrial sectors experience a range of event types, with some industries experiencing very 
specific categories of effect while others being targeted for a broad range of effects.  
 
In Figure 2, the level of cyber event activity in different sectors is ranked into three tiers—High, 
medium, and low—to identify which sectors are currently most prone to the types of 
cyberattacks that make it into the public record. Sectors that experience more than 15 percent of 
all cyber events in our dataset fit into the highest tier. Government services and professional 
services fall into this category; together, they account for 38 percent of all events recorded.  
 
Medium-activity sectors include those that see at least 3.8 percent, but less than 15 percent, of 
the events in the full dataset. Sectors falling into this tier include information services, education, 
healthcare, finance, retail, entertainment, and accommodation services. The nine sectors in this 
category experienced approximately 56.7 percent of the total number of cyber events, suggesting 
that a larger breadth of industries is affected by significant numbers of cyber events. 
 
The lowest activity tier includes sectors that had fewer than 3.8 percent of the total events. This 
tier includes traditional industries that are less dependent on information technology than other 
sectors of the modern economy, such as agriculture, mining, real estate, and construction. Two 
sectors considered critical infrastructure—transportation and utilities—also fell into this tier.   
 
In addition to the frequency of event activity, the nature of those effects is also an important 
factor in assessing risk to specific sectors. In Figure 3, the percentage of total cyber events 
characterized as exploitive is plotted versus the percentage that are disruptive in nature. Only the 
ten sectors with the highest frequencies of cyber events are represented in the figure, as many of 
the low tier sectors have too few observations to draw meaningful conclusions.  
Figure	3:	Exploitive	vs	Disruptive	as	a	Share	of	Total	Events	for	Top	10	Industry	Sectors	
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Among the industries that are represented, there appears to be significant differences in the 
relative frequencies of exploitative versus disruptive events. For instance, the Retail and 
Accommodation and Food Services sectors predominately experience exploitation events (>95 
percent Exploitive) whereas the Government Services sector faces a broader mix of exploitation 
and disruptive events (53 percent Exploitive, 47 percent Disruptive).  
 
The only sectoral category where the relative frequency of exploitative and disruptive events is 
roughly the same as in the entire data set (70 percent Exploitive, 30 percent Disruptive) is the 
“other” category. The relative frequency within most sectors is significantly different from the 
average distribution. This highlights the importance of assessing risks on a per industry basis 
instead of applying general guidance about what types of cyber events are most common. 
 
Lastly, the categories of cyber events are also found to vary between sectors. Table 1 highlights 
all cyber events, by share, drawing out some interesting differences. For example, while 
Accommodation and Food Services represent only 4.8 percent of all cyber events in the dataset, 
that sector accounts for over 36 percent of all Exploitation of Sensor events, well above the 
average rate of 3.8 percent. This observation draws attention to the heavy targeting by hackers of 
PoS devices used by fast food restaurants and hotels. The same sector is under-represented for 
Message Manipulation events. Only 3.4 percent of the events it experienced fell in this category, 
compared to the average of 17.9 percent for all sectors.   
 
Differences between sectors in the frequencies of different types of cyber events likely reflect 
differences in attacker motivations, vulnerabilities, and benefits that can be obtained through 
different types of exploitation of data disruption of key organizational services. For example, 
Government Services suffers more Message Manipulation and External Denial of Service event 
types, whereas it does not see many Application Server events. A review of specific incidents in 
the dataset reveals a large number of attacks against websites aimed at promoting a political 
message. These attacks are often exploiting misconfigurations and can be automated thereby 
promoting larger numbers of events, whereas exploitation of applications might not occur as 





Having an easy-to-use taxonomy that provides an exclusive, exhaustive, and consistent way to 
differentiate the primary effects of cyber activity will help organizational leaders and policy 
makers have more sophisticated discussions about the different types of threats they face, and the 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies. The taxonomy presented in this paper and the analysis of 
three years of publicized cyber event data highlights variance in scale, effects, and method. 
Differences in the types of disruptive or exploitive attacks directly inform organizational leaders 
on both the range as well as concentration of effects they might face. By disentangling tactics 
from effect this classification provides a first step in creating a framework by which 
organizational leaders can categorize and assess the most consequential forms of cyber attack 
they might face. Additional work to measure the impact of specific attacks would allow 
organizations and governments to adequately plan for the types of threats they are most likely to 
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face, and invest in the technology, training, and processes needed to defend against the most 
consequential forms of attack.   
 
Understanding the variation of effect by industry allows organizational leaders to be more 
focused on defensive strategies, resiliency measures, or training programs that address specific 
effects they are likely to face, rather than interpreting vague guidance by experts or by 
purchasing technical solutions that might not be as useful for the threats they face.  
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Table 1: Cyber Events by Type and Industry Sector
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